Category Archives: resources

Après le diamant, l’or, le coltan…La guerre du “nickel” en RDC

Le Potentiel, Kinshasa, 12-Oct-2009: La République démocratique du Congo n’est pas encore sortie du tunnel. Après la guerre économique sur fond du commerce illégal du diamant, de l’or, de la cassitérite, du bois… c’est maintenant le tour du pétrole et surtout du « nickel ». Dans la partie orientale de la RDC, précisément en Ituri, on vient de découvrir du « nickel » à l’état pur. Ce minerai fait déjà courir de nombreux acquéreurs de tous bords. Ce qui explique cette « résistance » à la paix, ces hésitations à ne pas maîtriser les criminels de la LRA, cette armée du Seigneur composée des rebelles ougandais.

« Ganga latina ». Les Congolais doivent désormais s’habituer à ces mots et à ce vocabulaire qui entreront sûrement dans le langage des conflits en RDC si jamais toutes les dispositions ne sont pas prises pour arrêter la boulimie des « faiseurs de guerre et de paix ». Selon le Père Sergio de la congrégation des « Missionnaires Comboniens », il s’agit d’une montagne dans la partie Est de la Province Orientale, précisément dans le périmètre qui regroupe les villes de Dungu, Faradje, Bunia. C’est dans cette montagne que l’on vient de découvrir du « nickel » à l’état pur.

« Une grande guerre est en gestation. N’oubliez pas le pétrole, n’oubliez pas le bois, n’oubliez pas la « ganga latina », cette montagne où l’on a récemment découvert du nickel, presqu’à l’état pur ». Ce sont les déclarations du Père Sergio reprises dans le reportage réalisé par Colette Braeckman du Journal Le Soir, paraissant en Belgique.

Avant toute chose, retenons que le « nickel », est un minerai. Mieux, un élément métallique qui entre dans la composition de nombreux alliages, notamment des aciers inoxydables. En d’autres termes, le nickel demeure un métal précieux qui intervient dans la fabrication des métaux devrant intervenir tant dans le domaine de la construction, des ponts et chaussées, le secteur automobile, ustentiles de ménage… bref, dans l’industrie lourde et légère. Un métal à l’image du « coltan » qui remplit des fonctions diverses dans le domaine spatial et de la téléphonie cellulaire. Or, le « nickel » se trouve justement dans cette montagne, « Ganga latina », à l’état pur. Traité, il donnera d’autres dérivés utiles.

A Faradje, Gungu, Bunia, on perçoit déjà la ruée des « chercheurs des pépites ». L’une des raisons qui explique que la neutralisation des éléments de la LRA tire en longueur Car, sous prétexte de combattre la LRA avec les opérations « Coup de tonnerre et Rudia », la prospection se poursuit, loin de tout contrôle. Il n’est pas exclu que l’exploitation clandestine de ce minerai ait déjà commencé. Le père combonien ne prêche surtout pas dans le désert. Il sait ce qu’il dit. Tant il est vrai que la zone reste encore hypermilitarisée avec plusieurs armées : celles de la RDC, de l’Ouganda et du Sud Soudan. La sous – région est également infestée par de nombreux groupes armés et milices : LRA, FPI, FPJC… et tant d’autres.

LE PETROLE DU LAC ALBERT

Mais avant le « nickel », le « pétrole du Lac Albert » suscite déjà de nombreuses polémiques et controverses, c’est selon, entre la RDC et l’Ouganda. Des incidents ont déjà eu lieu avec mort d’hommes, de part et d’autre de ces deux pays.

Cependant, le « pétrole » du Lac Albert est une question de vie ou de mort pour l’Ouganda. Raison pour laquelle les autorités ougandaises usent de tous les prétextes pour exercer une pression sur la RDC, allant jusqu’ à envoyer leurs troupes au Congo pour des raisons sécuritaires Aussi, tant qu’ il ne sera pas institué une « Zone d’intérêts communs » pour l’exploitation commune de cette ressource pétrolière, et que les frontières lacustres n’ auront pas été clairement confirmées conformément à la charte de l’ ONU et de l’ Union africaine, il faut s’armer pour gérer de nombreux incidents de tous genres. Et si cette situation perdure, une « guerre n’est pas du tout à exclure ». Il n y a qu’à se tourner vers le passé pour écarter toute attitude naïve. Le panel des experts de l’ONU sur le pillage des ressources congolaises est édifiant à ce sujet.

D’autre part, il nous revient que le « métal jaune », entendez l’ or, s’annonce sous des perspectives heureuses. Les cours sont à la hausse et que la partie orientale, celle de l’Ituri, accuse une réserve évaluée à 22 milliards USD.

Devant ces perspectives heureuses, les sociétés aurifères, à savoir AngloGold Ashanti et Randgold ont décidé « de s’associer pour exploiter les mines d’or de l’ Ituri ». Elles n’ont pas tort.

John MacGloin, un analyste d’exploitation minière dans la société d’expertise londonienne Arhutnot Securitie Ltd, est formel : « Si vous souhaitez conserver votre position, vous vous devez d’aller chercher dans les lieux, comme le Congo, parce que c’est là que les gisements sont très riches ».

Ce potentiel explique cette situation d’insécurité en Ituri. Des groupes armés et milices servent d’écran à des investisseurs d’opérette, des criminels économiques sans foi ni loi qui profitent de la crise politique en RDC pour tirer les marrons du feu afin de s’enrichir. Entre-temps, des groupes armés, comme la LRA, se constituent une « véritable économie de guerre » qui leur permet de résister et de rejeter chaque fois des offres de la paix.

Mais en réalité, face à la « crise financière » qui sévit dans le monde, pour résister, de nombreux pays s’appuient maintenant sur l’ « économie réelle ». Ils vont à la conquête de nouveaux espaces économiques pour contrôler le « pétrole, le diamant, l’or, le coltan, le bois, l’eau… », bref les matières premières.

Pierre Conesa, dans son article prophétique intitulé « Y a-t-il un risque américain pour l’Europe ? » est précis : « Au-delà des menaces désormais classiques (prolifération et terrorisme), certains des principaux scénarios de guerre dans l’ avenir sont soit des actions militaires uni-latérales (comme celle qu’ont décidée les Etats-Unis en Irak) soit un (ou des ) conflit(s) pour le contrôle des ressources rares ».

C’est ce qui se passe exactement en République démocratique du Congo depuis plus d’une décennie, réflètant justement cette prédilection. Les autorités congolaises doivent savoir lire les signes des temps pour éviter que la génération future les accuse de « complices ».

VERITABLE CRI D’ALERTE

La déclaration du Père Sergio constitue un véritable cri d’alerte. Une sonnette d’alarme pour que les responsables congolais, à tous les niveaux, prennent leurs responsabilités. Une fois de plus, ce « calotin » ne prêche nullement dans le désert en parlant « d’une grande guerre en gestation ». Tant que celle-ci sera sous-tendue par des enjeux économiques, les « faiseurs de guerre » qui ne sont nullement des enfants de choeur, useront de tous les sortilèges pour déstabiliser le pays de manière à continuer à le piller, avec l’aide de leurs hommes de main.

La situation est tellement si préoccupante qu’elle a été portée à l’autel du Synode de paix à Rome. En effet, dans une déclaration lue à cet effet, Mgr François Xavier Maroy Rusengo, archevêque de Bukavu, a annoncé son départ de Rome pour regagner Bukavu devant la « grave situation au Sud-Kivu ». Auparavant, il a été rendu publique la déclaration des « Missionnaires Comboniens » de plusieurs continents qui viennent de manifester leur solidarité avec les populations du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu et de la Province Orientale de la RDC. Ils dénoncent la tragique situation dan laquelle vivent les populations congolaises et condamnent avec véhémence la « grande destruction » commise par la LRA et les FDLR. Ils se sont adressés à l’ONU et au Parlement européen pour leur demander d’assumer leurs responsabilités en allant au secours des populations congolaises en danger pour leur apporter assistance. « Il faut mettre toute la pression nécessaire sur les gouvernements occidentaux pour qu’ils agissent et arrêtent cette catastrophe qui est en train de dévaster le nord-est du Congo. Ce qui est déplorable, c’est que ces abus et cette tragédie sont en train de se réaliser sous les yeux de ceux qui devraient protéger la population civile », souligne cette déclaration qui vient de faire allusion à la présence inefficace de la MONUC.

Les Missionnaires comboniens ont vu juste. Car, les revenus de cette «guerre économique » profitent avant tout aux gouvernements occidentaux, et non au peuple congolais, lesquels gouvernements opèrent à travers leurs multinationales. Faut-il attendre que cette « nouvelle guerre en gestation » éclate pour continuer à compter les morts en RDC ? Cynique.

http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=87298

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Congo’s contract review: Its strategic and economic significance

Reprinted from Pambazuka News on January 17, 2008, the anniversary of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

Maurice Carney analyses the recently-concluded review of Congo’s mining contracts and the significance of this process in safeguarding the country’s considerable mineral wealth..

On par with a resolution to the current conflict in the northeast of the Congo is the mining review process that the Congolese government announced in April 2007. The government initiated a review of some 60 odd mining contracts, established during the period of conflict (1996 – 2002) and the transition (2003 – 2006). The review offers an opportunity for the Congolese government to stop the systematic looting of the Congo. The review is now complete but the government has yet to publish the results. In spite of repeated requests and pressure from civil society to make the review process transparent, the government has kept the process shrouded in secrecy. In early November, the Congolese newspaper, Le Phare [1] published what it claimed to be leaked results of the review, which stated that many of the contracts would be renegotiated or outright cancelled. Reuters [2] also reported that it saw preliminary reports that called for 61 mining contracts to be renegotiated or cancelled. The impact of these news reports was swift and global in scope; publicly traded mining companies with interests in the Congo on the London, Toronto and New York stock exchanges experienced a sudden drop in their stock prices. This provided some insight into the significance of Congo’s resources to investors in the West. Moreover, it begins to explain in part why the Congo, probably more than any other African nation, has been subjected to repeated external intervention. Kwame Nkrumah stated as much in his Challenge of Congo, [3] when he observed that the Congolese peoples’ struggle is both an internal and external one. The forces arrayed against the Congolese are enormous and global in scope. Foreign governments, global mining conglomerates, multi-lateral institutions and local elites all work in concert to control Congo’s fabulous wealth in perpetuity.

Watchdog groups such as Global Witness estimate that 70 percent of Congo’s copper wealth may already by sold-off to foreign mining companies without little discernible benefit to the Congolese people [4]. Billions of dollars have been raised in the financial markets of London, New York and Toronto while the Congolese people suffer from crushing poverty and debilitating and incessant conflict.

According to the Canadian Journal Corporate Knights, some companies stand to gain spectacular wealth at the expense of the Congolese people. Tenke Mining from Canada, who recently merged with the Lundin Group, also from Canada acquired the Tenke Fungurume concession for just $15 million. The mine is reputed to be valued at $60-billion and contains the largest and highest grade of undeveloped copper cobalt deposits in the world [5]. American mining giant Phelps-Dodge, recently bought out by Freeport McMoRan, also has ownership in the Tenke Fungurume deposits. In spite of reports by human rights groups that the contracts around Tenke Fungurume represent one of the most odious in the Congo, the United States government Overseas Private Investment Corporation recently provided risk insurance for Freeport McMoRan’s billion dollar Congolese venture [6].

When Katanga Mining announced its potential merger –worth about $3.3 billion- with Nikanor in early November, its stock price jumped 42 percent. According to Katanga Mining chair, Arthur H. Ditto, the agreement “sets the course to establish one of the largest and most important mining complexes in the world.” [7] The remarkable benefits to these companies are clear and unmistakable but when it comes to the people of the Congo, the benefits are hard to find. Corporate Knights says of the Katanga mining agreement with the Congolese government that it “allows a tax regime that appears to offer very little benefit to the Congolese government.” [8] One of the key principals of Katanga mining is Belgian, George Forrest for whom the United Nations prescribed financial sanctions as a result of his participation in the illegal exploitation of Congo’s resources. It was also revealed that George Forrest was a key funder of Joseph Kabila’s political party, People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) during the 2006 elections. [9] In April 2007, the Congolese newspaper “Le Potentiel” reported that Nikanor got the KOV concession located in the Katanga province in 2005 by promising to lend Gecamines, Congo’s state company 24 million Euros. Le Potentiel noted that should Nikanor sell its rights to the KOV concession, its two principles, Bennie Steinmetz and Dan Gertler would stand to pocket 350 million Euros each without producing a single gram of copper [10] . Nikanor executives say the KOV project represents “the highest grade major ore body in the world.” This may explain why the listing of Nikanor on the London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) at $1.5 billion represented the largest valuation of any company in history on entry to AIM. Together Katanga Mining and Nikanor have raised over $2 billion for the KOV project, [11]which is about the same amount of the proposed 2007 Congolese government budget.

Clearly with the hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, renegotiation or cancellation of any of the contracts mentioned above is highly unlikely and potentially as risky as the conflict in the east for the Kabila government. The Congolese people are watching to see whose interests the government will serve. The results from the contract review process will serve as one of the key determinants to the relationship between the Kabila administration and the people of the Congo for the duration of his tenure as head of state. However, one must say that there is little chance that Kabila will act in the interest of the people of the Congo. Many observers believe that if it were not for the insistence of long-time nationalist and current Prime Minister who served as Deputy Prime Minister to Lumumba in 1960, Antoine Gizenga the mining review process may not even have been initiated in the first place. Now that the review is complete, the Kabila government finds itself in a quandary regarding the publication of the report’s contents, knowing that the people of the Congo are being vigilant in regard to the future of their country’s wealth.

When one contemplates the corporate and foreign political forces, as have been outlined in this article and elsewhere, surely the most casual observer would say that the die in all likelihood has already been cast for the Congolese people to be impoverished for generations to come. The international finance community is determined to consign the people of the Congo to pauperization, dependency and perpetual supplier of raw materials for the West’s economic benefit. In fact, a key reason Kabila received unconditional support from the West prior to the 2006 elections, is because he had made it clear to them that he would facilitate unfettered access to Congo’s riches and preside over a client regime. Kabila infamously stated “I invited the business community to go into the Congo just like Stanley did way back in the 1800s and I told the business community back then that they had to have a spirit of adventurism – go see what is happening look at the opportunities and of course install yourself.”[12] The arrogance with which these western forces and their local sycophants are moving, one gets the sense that they feel entitled to the wealth of the Congo even as the soil of the Congo is drenched with the blood of its sons and daughters. There is a callous disregard for the at least 4 million Congolese who have perished in the current scramble for the country’s riches. It appears that the devaluation of the African people, the Congolese in particular has been normalized to the point where millions dead and hundreds of thousands of black bodies raped and sexually mutilated while local elites and multi-national corporations enrich themselves hardly register a whimper of indignation or protest.

As people of conscience, we must do our utmost to expose one of the greatest heist of the 21st century and provide solidarity to those Congolese who have been waging a historic fight for genuine independence, democratic rule and control of their country’s resources. Anything less makes us co-conspirators in the devaluing of our self-worth as Africans and the debasing of our sense of dignity as human beings. The words of Che Guevara are ever present and relevant when he asserts, “The Congo problem is a world problem. Victory will be continental in its reach and its consequences and so would defeat.”[13] Should one agree with Guevara, Nkrumah, Fanon and others who spoke of the significance of the Congo to the future of Africa, people throughout the African world must:
1. Aggressively raise awareness about the situation in the Congo
2. Determinedly mobilize global support on behalf of the Congolese people
3. Doggedly resist corporate appropriation of the Congo’s wealth
4. Actively support progressive forces and civil society in the Congo

* Maurice Carney is Executive Director of Friends of the Congo

*Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

* Please click on the link for the article notes
Notes:

1. A Congolese newspaper (http://www.lepharerdc.com)
2. http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idUSL038482120071103?sp=true
3. Kwame Nkrumah. Challenge of Congo, PANAF Books,1960.
4. Global Witness, “Digging in Corruption: Fraud, Abuse and Exploitation in Katanga’s Copper and Cobalt Mines,” July 2006, p. 37.
5.http://www.corporateknights.ca/content/page.asp?name=OECDmatrix. June 5, 2006
6. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94456.htm
7.http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article2820766.ece
8.http://www.corporateknights.ca/content/page.asp?name=OECDmatrix
9. Op cit. Global Witness p.52
10. Le Potentiel. “Mines et contrats léonins au Katanga: Des maffieux gagnent des millions d’eurosLe Potentiel” April 6, 2007
11.http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20060713/ai_n16529131Nikanor becomes AIM’s largest float Independent, The (London), Jul 13, 2006 by Saeed Shah
12.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWwGQZa8kVc
13. by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Aleida Guevara March, Patrick Camiller (Translator), Patrick Camiller (Translator), The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo. Grove/Atlantic, Inc., September 2001

DRC’s Economic War

We are pleased, as part of our commitment to sharing thoughtful and insightful commentary on the Democratic Republic of Congo, to post this essay by Zahra Moloo. A full pdf version, formatted and with references is available but for those with assistive technology needs, the full text is posted below.

Congo Mine
Source Oxfam, NZ

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Economic War: Investigating the Origin of Anonymous Commodities in the Global Capitalist System

“Since the 19th century, when the world looks at Congo it sees a pile of riches with some black people inconveniently sitting on top of them. They eradicate the Congolese people so they can possess the mines and resources. They destroy us because we are an inconvenience.” As he speaks, I picture the raped women with bullets burying through their intestines and try to weigh them against the piles of blood-soaked electronic goods sitting beneath my Christmas tree with their little chunks of Congolese metal whirring inside. Bertrand smiles and says, “Tell me, who are the savages? Us, or you?”

-Johann Hari
“Congo’s Tragedy, the War the World Forgot”

In Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, first published in 1899 and years later subject to a polemical but much-needed critique by one of Africa’s most prolific writers, King Leopold’s colonial project in the Congo is described as “the vilest scramble for loot that ever disfigured the history of human conscience.” More than a century later, after a protracted war in which an estimated 4.2 million citizens perished and the nation’s stability was invested in the UN’s largest peacekeeping force to date, Conrad’s oft-repeated phrase is, tragically, just as pertinent. Yet despite such baffling statistics, the Congo receives only cursory attention in the international media. When Western news analysts do find something of relevance to disseminate to their audiences, it remains unknowingly tainted by the same discourse which animated the historical narratives of European travelers and writers such as Conrad, seeking to project an image of this other world as antithetical in its “triumphant bestiality” to civilized European society. To be sure, Conrad’s writings carry overtly racist descriptions considered unacceptable today, but the simple act of using the title “Heart of Darkness” to describe the Congo war, as one American news report did in January 2002, perpetuates historical representations of the Congo as “inherently chaotic and irrational” and guarantees that western observers, worlds away from the daily suffering of the people on their television screens, will dismiss acts of violence as “lacking in political rationale.” With the purpose of rectifying common misrepresentations which by virtue of their carelessness are responsible for enacting a double violence in addition to the more palpable forms of violence enacted against the people of the Congo, this paper attempts to provide a more accurate depiction of the second Congo war which began in 1998 and which has been described as the deadliest since World War II. The very first step in redressing the errors of representation concerns the terminology employed when referring to the Congo war. To describe the Congo war as a “civil war” is not only erroneous but also irresponsible. The connection between American news observers and acts of grotesque violence taking place in the DRC is more direct than most acknowledge; the Congo war was an international war in which legitimate and illegitimate actors alike, neighboring African states, rebel groups, multinational companies and western consumers contributed to the creation of an “alternative system of profit” from the country’s abundant and lucrative natural resources.

A variety of resources abound in Africa. In 1979, the continent was responsible for 80 per cent of the world’s gold production, 75 per cent of its diamonds, and large quantities of antimony, manganese, chrome, copper, cobalt, coltan, uranium and petroleum. Large quantities of these resources are found in the Central African region, specifically in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an enormous swathe of land the size of Western Europe. 15 per cent of the world’s niobium reserves and 80 per cent of its tantalum reserves are found in Africa, and of this quantity, the Congo contains 60 per cent of the niobium deposits and 80 per cent of the tantalum. It is estimated that some $6 million in raw cobalt alone exits the DRC daily. In 2004, during the second Congo war, another cobalt ore, heterogenite, was departing the DRC at a rate of 6 000 tons per month. The abundance of natural resources in the Congo has been the primary factor influencing the country’s turbulent past and the profitability of resource extraction for the disparate actors involved in the war was responsible for perpetuating the 6-year conflict. Failure to adequately address and analyze the economic causes of the second Congo war is therefore little short of outrageous. Unfortunately, the problem of insufficient analysis of the causes and determinants of the Congo war is not restricted solely to the realm of media, but also includes scholarly explanations of the war that more often than not are suffused with familiar terminology borrowed from the discipline of political science which become unduly preoccupied with theoretical explanations of “state behavior,” “political order” and the like. Denis M Tull in his book The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu claims that in fact, hardly any other issue concerning the conflict in the DRC has attracted more attention by academics, the media and the wider public than the “interplay of violence and economics,” but if one peruses the limited literature on the second war in the DRC, it is clear that the explanations are found wanting. Even among the best literature on the Congo war, one finds that habitual academic detachment which expresses itself in the form of “fascination” with the “postcolonial traumas” afflicting the DRC. This is not to say that most academic works to date have failed to provide thorough explanations of the political causes and consequences of the Congo war, but that the most neglected feature of the war, namely the importance of natural resources, is the one which might best expose the motivations of the numerous actors in the war to continue engaging in conflict.

In no way does the fact of placing the onus for the war on the lucrative resource extraction industry and its respective actors minimize the historical political precedents to the Congo war, but these political factors cannot be divorced from economic determinants. This paper will therefore provide an analysis of the way in which Congo’s resources heralded an age of mass exploitation beginning with the reign of Leopold II of Belgium whose brutal practices resulted in 5 to 8 million deaths from murder, starvation, exhaustion and disease. It will go on to examine the transference of power from the hands of King Leopold II to the multinational companies operating in the Congo during Belgian colonialism and subsequently, during the rule of Mobutu. The main body of the paper will diverge from historical analyses to examine the mass appropriation of resources during the Congo war by the many disparate actors aforementioned and the ways in which they interacted to advance an effective economic agenda. Those who attempt to analyze 20th century civil wars of African countries in possession of lucrative mineral resources without adequately addressing the relationship between violence and profit are committing a gross act of injustice. It is my fervent hope that in addressing this issue, this paper will succeed in exposing the tyranny of modern capitalism in an increasingly integrated global economy and its role in eroding both the sovereignty of independent nations and the dignity of human individuals.

I. Resource Exploitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo Prior to the Civil War

The Most Profitable Colony in Africa: Leopold II and Belgian Colonialism
If one attempted to conceptualize the loss of sovereignty experienced by the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo over the course of more than a century, the starting point would perhaps be a day in the year 1885 when the state of the Congo was first proclaimed the personal possession of King Leopold II of Belgium. On that day, all “vacant land,” was declared the property of the state. Vast swathes of the country’s territory, including a number of inhabited villages were leased out to private companies whose shareholders were for the most part Belgian, but over 50 per cent of the profits went directly into the hands of the King. His profit making enterprise involved seizing as much ivory as possible from ivory raids, buying tusks from villagers or direct confiscation. Africans were often forced at gunpoint to accept extremely low prices in exchange for the ivory in their possession and tens of thousands of porters, carrying everything from ammunition to red wine on the road which brought ivory supplies from the interior to the sea, endured weeks of hunger and fatigue before perishing of exhaustion at the end of the voyages.
Even more appalling in its brutality than the ivory raids was the establishment of a highly profitable wild rubber industry which arose in the 1890s when the industrial world was developing an appetite for hoses, tubing, and rubber insulation for the telegraph, the telephone and electrical wiring. Increasing competition from the cultivation of rubber in Latin America and Asia acted as a further impetus to the development of the rubber industry in the Congo. The sole requirement for harvesting enormous quantities of rubber was labour, but as writer Adam Hochschild notes, labour could not be obtained through enslavement since it required adept skills for arduous, painful work. The system of collection instituted therefore required each man in a village to collect about 3 to 4 kilos of dried rubber per fortnight which meant full-time labour. If a village refused to provide rubber, its inhabitants would either be shot or have their hands cut off. Soldiers returned to their officials with baskets of hands or heads indicating the number of people killed.

By the turn of the century, the Congo was producing more than eleven million pounds of rubber a year and it was the most profitable colony in Africa, with total rubber earnings increasing by 96 times from 1890 to 1904. Of these proceeds, a significant portion went to companies such as the Compagnie du Kasai and the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber and Exploration Company (ABIR) which invested 1.35 francs per kilo for harvesting, and sold it in Antwerp for 10 francs per kilo, a profit of more than 700 per cent. In order to guarantee such high profits, the company ABIR in 1900 sent 159 firearms and 40 355 rounds of ammunition to a single rubber-collecting post out of the 35 existing ones to suppress rebellions against rubber-collecting. Of the money that went directly to King Leopold, a large part was invested in the development of public works and urban improvement in the country of Belgium. Today, the enthusiastic tourist can visit monuments and public works whose establishment was accompanied by a massacre of holocaust proportions. The Arcade du Cinquantenaire in Brussels, the Tervuren Museum, public works at Ostend, and extensions to the Royal Palace were all funded by the Congo Free State.
With the transfer of the Congo Free State colony from the private possession of the Belgian king to the Belgian government after 1908, the brutal massacres abated but the economic structure of the country remained intact. The country continued to finance the development of the Belgian metropolis, and with time, the development of other European countries. Its very existence, like most African territories under colonialism, was completely oriented toward the development of the industrialized world. So profitable was the colony that during World War Two, the Belgian government in London was in a position to expend 40 million pounds on its armed forces in Europe and Africa as well as on diplomatic service and related expenditures without having to extract any money from the Belgian gold reserve. Some of the tasks performed by the Congolese during this time included the same tasks performed under Leopold, such as rubber collecting and porterage. Economically, the country came to occupy an increasingly significant niche in the international economy, expanding away from the development of the little nation of Belgium to contribute to more ambitious projects such as the development of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which were made from Congolese high-quality uranium.

The most efficacious method to ensure that the Belgian Congo would yield profits as high as under Leopold entailed giving more autonomy to the companies established shortly before the transfer of power occurred in 1908. Such companies included Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), described by Nzongola-Ntalaja as the “the giant mining company and the single most important business enterprise in the Congo’s economy.” Established in 1906, with direct ties to the royal family, this company owned the Shinkolobwe mine that provided uranium for the making of the atomic bombs. Others were involved in mineral and timber exploitation, especially in Katanga, one of the most economically strategic regions of the country where the second largest company after Union Minière, the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK) began constructing a railroad to transfer minerals from mining centres to international ports in Congo, Angola and Mozambique. Mineral exploitation was not restricted to Belgian companies, but included British involvement through the company Tanganyika Concessions Limited (TCL) which held 14.5 per cent of shares in the UMHK. 48 per cent of these shares belonged to British banks such as Barclays, Midland, Bearing and Rothschild. American and German interests, while limited, developed later in the form of investments in the colonial company Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l’Industrie (CCCI), established in 1887 for the purpose of constructing the lower Congo railroad.

With the proliferation of these companies the economy was re-directed from rubber extraction to other forms of mineral wealth. Before World War One, rubber and ivory extraction comprised 96 per cent of exports from the Belgian Congo; by 1926, mineral exports constituted 61 per cent of total exports. Copper production began in 1911, diamond mining in 1913, tin in 1918, and uranium and radium mining in 1922. By 1932 the country had attracted more than 100 million pounds of foreign capital, 56 per cent of which was controlled by the Belgian company Société Générale, which itself controlled Union Minière. Already by 1929 the company Union Minière was producing 140 000 tons of copper per year and copper accounted for 50 per cent of the Congo’s exports, 7 per cent of total world copper production. The company was the biggest single employer of Congolese labour, functioning in much the same way as had ABIR during the time of King Leopold. Authors Greg Lanning and Marti Mueller claim that the mining companies which grew progressively stronger in the colonial period acted as independent entities “only tenuously connected to the colonial administration,” with Union Minière virtually ruling the copper-rich Katanga province. In total, 61 per cent of capital invested in the Belgian Congo was linked to the development of the country’s mineral resources.

Also during Belgian colonial rule, companies representing the interests of other European countries became increasingly involved in extraction activities. Although these companies functioned relatively independently of the colonial administration, their interests were in no way divorced from the financial concerns of the countries where they were based. The early “internationalization” of the Congo through the proliferation of British, German and Belgian companies is testimony to the country’s enormous economic potential. One author has argued that this internationalization explains the upheavals which occurred during Congo’s independence in 1960 including the political chaos which emerged in Katanga province when secessionists, Union Minière, and Europeans with capital investments in the mineral-rich province favored the separation of the region from the country at large in order to sustain its autonomy. As the following pages will demonstrate, the multiplication of numerous interests expanded long after colonialism came to an end.

Scramble After Independence: The Cold War Years and Mobutu

After independence in 1960, the vast territory of the Congo was subject to a new scramble for resources which led to further internationalization of the region. Manning and Mueller claim that the 1950s just prior to independence was the “heyday of mining companies in Africa” when a “great wave of exploration swept across the continent” and mineral companies discovered huge reserves of unexploited bauxite, iron ore, copper and other lucrative resources. American interests in the Congo in particular had become more pronounced following the end of the Second World War which coincided with the rise of America’s military-industrial complex and its determination to assume control of strategic mineral resources. In the escalating tensions of the Cold War, President Dwight Eisenhower, acknowledged in his 1952 presidential campaign the vital importance of the Congo’s position in the international economy, stating that “whoever controls Belgian Congo will control the rest of the continent.” Exaggerating anxieties that the country would incline toward the Communist side in the Cold War struggle for power after its independence from Belgian, and determined to gain access to the country’s mineral wealth, the American government backed the assassination of democratically–elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and helped install Mobutu Sese Seko as president, one of the most corrupt African leaders who ruled from 1964 to 1997 and eventually drove the country to economic collapse. Assassinating Lumumba was also in the interests of Belgian private interest groups who feared the nationalization of the UMHK under a newly elected democratic government.

The official proclamation of independence in 1960 in no way meant that the country had gained sovereignty over its territory. Even Mobutu’s attempts to provide his country with the opportunity to become the “architect of its own destiny,” in the early years of independence, by instituting the Bakajika law of 1966 to enable the state to gain control of all land and mineral rights, and by transforming UMHK in 1967 into a nationalized company, Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) were met with swift reprisals. The Belgian government immediately imposed an embargo on copper imports from the DRC and sought the cooperation of other European countries in imposing economic sanctions. The result was a compromise which consolidated foreign dominance over the mining industry as Mobutu granted full compensation, management, processing and marketing contracts to a sister company of the UMHK, the Société Générale des Minerais. The latter company was to take care of all the servicing required for the operation of the nationalized company, including employment of personnel, and industrial and commercial management of the company. This incident in the turbulent history of the Congo demonstrates to what extent governing elites in the post-colonial period became simple intermediaries between resources and international mining companies ardent to gain strategic economic control over the region. Throughout the 1970s, American and European companies extracted tens of millions of dollars worth of minerals, the revenues of which were funneled directly into Mobutu’s private Swiss bank accounts. The Congo’s wealth, as Timothy Longman succinctly states, “helped to prop up the Mobutu regime long after it had lost public support.”

The highly lucrative extractive enterprise initiated under Leopold II was not discontinued with the arrival of Congo’s independence. The type and process of extraction were altered, but fundamentally, the new pro-Western Congolese government continued to operate “under the old economic and administrative structures.” Toward the end of the twentieth century, the Congolese economy was tailored specifically to serve foreign economic interests which had effectively replaced Belgian monopoly over the country. The absence of a strong political culture espousing sovereignty and democracy was testimony to the “political decline” and foreign economic domination which characterized the three decades of Zaire’s independence. In 1997, the end of the Mobutu years heralded a new era in the history of the country, a particularly brutal war, and a new president in the form of Laurent Kabila, leader of the rebel groups Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, (ADFL). The remaining pages are devoted to examining the second Congo war which emerged as a product of the historical precedents described above.

II. The Second Congo War; an “Alternative System of Profit”

Precedents to the War
Although the Second Congo War cannot be properly understood without clarifying the causes and effects of the First Congo War, it is not within the scope of this paper to provide a proper and thorough analysis of the initial war which arose in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when the Former Government of Rwanda, having fled the country, re-established administrative control over an estimated two million Rwandan refugees within the borders of the DRC. What is noteworthy about the first war is the speed with which the Congolese rebel group ADFL, backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Angola, was able to seize control of the mineral-rich areas of Shaba (formerly Katanga), eastern Zaire, Kasai and Kivu. The ADFL initiated a rebellion in early 1996 and by May 1997, its journey from the eastern peripheral regions of the country to the capital was complete. Mobutu fled to Morocco and Laurent Kabila declared himself president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, inheriting an external debt of $14 billion and a formal economy which had shrunk by over 40 per cent from 1988 to 1995.

The rebellion demonstrated that mineral-abundant regions had developed autonomy from Kinshasa, largely as a result of the predominance of mineral extraction of the type described in previous pages, where giant mining consortiums exploited rich mineral fields in disparate regions of the country over the course of a century. The rebellion was also a consequence of state collapse under Mobutu, which enabled a “web of complex power relations” to prevail in peripheral regions in the absence of proper state sovereignty, but this in turn was provoked and aided by the supremacy of foreign interests long after colonialism had ended.

Interestingly, although Kabila considered himself a revolutionary, liberating the country from the cancerous and stagnating rule of Mobutu, his personal desire to maintain power was no different from Mobutu’s, and in the years to come he consolidated rather than dissolved the economic structure in place which gave a free hand to those who wished to continue appropriating the country’s resources. If anything, a reciprocal relationship emerged between the rebel leader and foreign exploitative mining companies; Kabila recognized the importance of resource extraction to the success of his insurgency even before taking control of Kinshasa. In April 1997, he allegedly signed contracts with De Beers, a South African diamond conglomerate which for years had enjoyed monopoly access to Congo’s diamond fields under Mobutu, and with American Mineral Fields and Canadian-owned Tenke Mining Corporation, the latter eager to gain access to copper and cobalt reserves in Shaba province. Tenke was also given permission to buy diamonds in Kisangani, in return for supplying Kabila with cash and a jet for his private associates.

In addition to the companies, the American government, initially responsible for installing Mobutu in power, was one of the Kabila’s staunchest supporters. During the rebellion, an American diplomat and an ambassador frequently visited Kabila when the rebels were preparing to expand their regional insurgency with the aim of overthrowing Mobutu. When Kabila assumed power, the American government, in their unwavering support for both the Rwandan and the new Congolese government, went so far as to distort the number of refugees still remaining in Zaire, and instructed Kabila not to cooperate with UN investigations of the massacres of Hutu refugees during the ADFL rebellion. This sudden transfer of political support from Mobutu to Kabila on the part of mining companies and Western governments clearly indicates that economic incentives took precedence over concerns with democratic political legitimacy: Western countries supported a kleptocratic state under Mobutu until he was no longer useful after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Thereafter, a more promising leader emerged who espoused a “free market” approach in favor of the interests of mining companies and Western governments alike.

Soon after taking power, Kabila’s monopolization of power, frequent use of political repression, and final decision to distance himself from the external support of the Ugandan and Rwandan governments that were responsible for his victory in the first place led to an invasion orchestrated by Rwanda and Uganda in eastern Congo. In response, Kabila garnered support from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and convinced the government of the Central African Republic to grant his troops access to its territory. As the war escalated, the vested interests of the intervening countries grew until the war became not only profitable but also necessary for the various participants.

Regional Interests: Economic or Political?
Among the participants in the war whose primary motives are said to be political in nature include the governments of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda. It is worth considering the various interpretations which examine political motives for the rebellion, for even if economic incentives took precedence over political motivations, simplistic analyses limited solely to the economic domain preclude a nuanced understanding of the entire conflict.

Angola entered the war for the same reason it intervened in the 1996-1997 war: to defend itself against Jonas Savimbi’s rebel movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) which had suspected ties to Rwanda and Uganda, and to maintain a regime favorable to its interests in Kinshasa. The Angolan government’s support for President Laurent Kabila came secondary to its internal political motivations and on two documented occasions, the government welcomed, if not ordered, the removal of Kabila.

It is widely held that Uganda and Rwanda initiated the rebellion with the aim of deposing Kabila and enforcing border security and by August 1998, their rebels had seized control of Goma, Bukavu, Uvira and the lucrative city of Kisangani. However, in the absence of a cohesive political ideology or interest uniting the various anti-Kabila rebels, the Congolese anti-Kabila Movement Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (RCD) as well as the Uganda-Rwanda alliance fragmented in the early stages of rebellion and the war was prolonged for eight years in a climate which precluded a definitive justification for any declared initial motives. Political fragmentation even occurred within military contingents. In the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), Ugandan soldiers were accused of taking sides with Hema communities against Lendu rivals, which alienated the Ugandan army from the Congolese a faction that had formed from the RCD aforementioned. Uganda’s failure to unify the various rebel factions further demonstrates the absence of an overarching aim, and anticipates the carving up of rebel-held territory into “virtual fiefdoms” as each faction tried to take power in eastern Congo.

It is unclear whether the fighting which broke out between the UPDF and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in August 1999, only one month after the signing of a cease-fire agreement was driven by political or economic motives. Over 600 soldiers and civilians were killed in an incident which political scientist Osita G. Afoaku claims reveals the differences between the two groups over the objectives and strategies of the war. By contrast, Timothy Longman posits that the fighting was fuelled by competition over diamonds being transported through Kisangani, suggesting perhaps that economic and political motives came to be indistinguishable over time. After all, he argues, Rwanda is a “small overpopulated country with almost no natural resources,” making its economic forays questionable to say the least. The tenuous nature of Rwanda’s apparent motives for invading the Congo is reinforced by the fact that Rwandan officials denied extraterritorial intervention in the Congo in the early stages of the war.

Evidence for the extent to which economic incentives determined invasion has been provided in the report, the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to the report, several accounts in Kampala suggest that Ugandan military officials who had served in the first war in the DRC “had a taste of the business potential of the region” and had even begun preparations prior to the second war to occupy and import resources from diamond and gold mines located in the east of the country. A witness in the area of Durba claimed that the Ugandan army did not even fight any battles in the gold mining areas, and they were “only here for the gold.” As soon as the war began, eastern territories controlled by Ugandan and Rwandan-backed groups practically became “de facto states,” autonomous from any central governing authority, in a manner reminiscent of the early colonial period where peripheral territories developed separately from the rest of the country under the control of large mining companies.

The remaining countries intervening in the war include Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. Zimbabwe felt justified intervening in defense of the territorial sovereignty of a neighboring country and furthermore had the military capacity to do so, as did Namibia. South Africa did not contribute militarily, and failed to come to Kabila’s defense during the war, but interestingly provided arms to both sides of the conflict and alleged moral support to the anti-Kabila forces.

It is certainly true, as historian Michael Nest argues, that the immediate precedents to the war were in large part political in nature and encompassed a number of issues from Rwandan citizenship rights in the Congo to regime security and ethnic tensions, yet economic incentives cannot be ignored. The well-known “greed versus grievance” concept introduced by former head of the World Bank Paul Collier and developed by several theorists eager to define in concrete terms the motivating factors of rebel insurrections, acknowledges that “greed” for economic resources takes precedence over political grievances. Collier’s theory, while valuable in defining a theoretical framework in which to situate the opposition between the political and the economic factors influencing civil conflicts, is quite simplistic in presenting such a stark distinction between the two motivating factors and undermines both complex causal historical phenomena as well as the human dimension of the suffering of war victims. Nevertheless, it accurately concludes that “circumstances that determine financial viability are potentially important regardless of the motivation for rebellion.” In the Congo war, economic motivations to sustain the war assumed priority over initial political factors as multiple actors found themselves in precarious political positions but absorbed in enormously profitable economic arrangements.

African Countries Profiting from War
Access to the DRC’s gold and diamond fields was enormously profitable for both the Ugandan and the Rwandan economy. Given that Uganda has no known diamond production, Ugandan officials were unable to provide data to the UN Panel of Exports on the quantity and profit of diamond exports, yet statistics provided by the Diamond High Council reveal that diamonds were exported from Uganda in the years which coincided with the second Congo war. Rough diamond exports from Uganda increased from 1511.35 carats in 1997 prior to the war, the equivalent of US$198 302 dollars, to 1 1024.46 carats in 1999, a value of US$ 1813 500. Likewise, Ugandan niobium exports were zero in 1995, but fetched US$780 000 in 1999, according to the World Trade Organization. Uganda effectively “became” a diamond and niobium exporting country, with no official evidence to explain how this occurred. Officials were able to provide statistics on the export of other minerals, including gold, coltan, tin and cobalt; the glaring discrepancies between the quantity of mineral produced and the quantity exported is alarming. For instance, in 1997, Uganda was producing 1.81 tons of tin and exporting 4.43 tons of tin. In 2005, gold was the third top Ugandan export, after coffee and fish, but domestic production of gold is negligible. Statistics document huge discrepancies between gold production and exports during the Congo war:

Official Ugandan Gold Import, Export and Production, Figures in $US
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gold Exports 18,600,000 38,360,000 55,730,000 50,350,000 59,900,000 45,760,000 45,590,000
Gold Imports 0 2,000 3,076,000 890,000 0 2,000 n/a
Local Gold Production n/a 40,307 477,000 1,412 24,817 23,000 21,000

Discrepancy 18,600,000 38,317,693 52,177,000 49,458,588 59,875,183 45,735,000 45,569,000

Source: Human Rights Watch. From: Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and Central Bank of Uganda. Statistics for 2004 are estimates.

The increase in gold exports evidently increased as the Congo war escalated, reaching a peak of US$ 59,900 000 in 2002 which constituted a shocking discrepancy of US$59, 875, 183 between production and export. As can be observed in the table above, official exports began to fall after 2002, the year in which a transitional government was installed in the Congo following the assassination of Laurent Kabila, and the UN peacekeeping forces MONUC were expanded from 5537 international military personnel to 8700.

Rwanda, like Uganda, has no known production of diamond, zinc, cobalt, manganese and uranium, but evidence obtained from the World Trade Organization, Belgium, and the Diamond High Council indicate that Rwanda exported a significant quantity of diamonds, receiving profits of $US 720 425 in 1997, and $US 1 788 036 in the year 2000. In the same period, Rwanda’s coltan exports are said to have doubled and in the years 1999 and 2000 alone, with the Rwandan army allegedly extracted resources in eastern Congo estimated at $250 million. Statistics on the profits garnered by the countries intervening in defense of Kabila are less extensive that those on the eastern regions of the country where Ugandan and Rwandan-backed groups were carrying out widespread atrocities, possibly because these countries were less invested in the clandestine illicit economy in minerals. Kabila himself gave his allies a share in the wealth of the country, including significant mining concessions to Zimbabwe. It has been documented that between 3000 and 5000 Zimbabwean soldiers were engaged in mining in the Shaba and Kasai Orientale Provinces during the war and Zimbabwe was also engaged in a logging contract to cut down 33 million hectares of trees with estimated profits worth $US 300 million through the Congolese company SOCEBO. Also since 1998, Angola has maintained a small military presence in oil-rich Bas-Congo. By the time the Lusaka Agreement was signed in 1999 to put an end to bring peace to the Congo, few of the combatants wanted to disengage from a war that had enabled them to profit enormously from the remaining “carcass” of a potentially rich country.

Perpetuating War: Beyond Regional Involvement
The habitual tendency to define a relationship between “African” issues divorced from a “separate international system” expresses itself, in the case of the second Congo war, in its characterization as “Africa’s First World War.” One of the most serious consequences of ascribing such a definition is that it detracts attention from the global interaction of the many participants without which the continued plunder of mineral resources would not have carried on unchecked. To be sure, certain features of the conflict warrant such a characterization, including the fact that physical extraction of resources took place on African soil, and several Central and Southern African countries were directly involved, not to mention Chad and Sudan. Insisting that the Congo war was primarily an African phenomenon is perhaps justifiable if international involvement occurred in the form of complicity or indifference from international actors or nation states. Yet the continuation of the conflict finds its very origin in the insidious, {albeit indirect}, contribution of Western countries, transnational mining companies and individual actors.

Among the countries that undoubtedly facilitated the continuation of the second Congo conflict is the United States, whose conspicuous historical intervention in the Congo during the Cold War years invariably led to the absence of a functioning democracy and the triumph of a predatory state under Mobutu. Augusta Muchai remarks that that a large percentage of the arms which were in circulation during the Congo war years were not acquired in the past decade, but rather during the Cold War. During the Mobutu years, the US provided $100 million in military training and $300 million in weapons to Zaire, the latter finding their way to a variety of sources over time through army defectors. Following the end of the Cold War, numerous countries in Eastern Europe including Romania, Slovakia, Belarus, and Bulgaria as well as Russia, North Korea and Brazil were willing to sell their arms for profit, and many found their way into Mobutu’s collection. Former colonizers, including France and Belgium also supplied military equipment to the governments of the Great Lakes region, with France providing military training as well as both heavy and light equipment to the Rwandan government in 1990. Shortly after, between 1991 and 1992, over US$ 6 million worth of arms were sent to the Rwandan government. After the overthrow of Mobutu, the US transferred its military allegiance to Uganda and Rwanda even though the state department had accused both countries of orchestrating widespread human rights abuses.

Western governments that provided weapons to African countries during the Cold War are perhaps only partially responsible for ensuring that such weapons are not used in illegal conflicts, but they are fully responsible for the consequences that ensue from direct assistance during or prior to the war years. It has been documented that the US helped to build the arsenals of eight of the nine governments directly involved in the war, trained the troops fighting on both sides of the conflict, and from 1991-1998, provided more than $227 million in training and weapons delivery to the continent, all of which was no doubt indispensable to the continuation of the conflict. Muchai demonstrates how the many resolutions undertaken to end the Second Congo conflict in the early years failed to address the contribution of the arms trade. All initiatives, including the Lusaka Agreement signed on 27 August 1999 focused on diplomatic, political and even military solutions without directly addressing the issue of arms proliferation, which had occurred over the course of decades through direct transfer of military equipment to all parties involved in the war.

One might argue that the provision of military assistance does not directly implicate the governments and weapons manufacturers in the atrocities perpetrated by rebel groups whose hands the weapons fall into, however, direct military aid was not the only contribution of Western governments to the continuation of the conflict. While weapons manufacturers are worlds away from end users in the Congo, and the purchase of a single weapon often involves several nations, corporations and brokers involved in the transfer of weapons at many different levels, political clout or “soft power” wielded by Western governments can go a long way toward impeding the escalation of conflict. Yet instead of adopting a firm diplomatic stance against the countries involved in the war, the US government had a double standard when addressing the conflict. The United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, condemned foreign intervention in the Congo as “unacceptable,” but the government declined to call for the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops and instead pressured Kabila to sign the Lusaka Agreement which treated the conflict as a “civil war,” Accordingly, UN peacekeepers were to be stationed along the ceasefire line in the middle of the country rather than at the borders where they could have monitored the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo. Not surprisingly, the Lusaka Agreement failed to bring peace to the country and the war was prolonged for several more years. The US was also among a number of Western countries that provided bilateral aid to the Ugandan and Rwandan governments supposedly intended for improvement in sanitation, health, governance and human rights, but which was instead documented in the savings budgets of the two countries, suggesting that these savings were used to finance the war.

International Financial Institutions, often inaccurately perceived as the moral watchdogs of the international political system, likewise contributed to the continuation of the conflict, most notably the International Monetary Fund which declined to take into consideration the uneasy connection between Uganda’s improved Balance of Payments and the exploitation of natural resources through illegal means. From 2001 to 2003, the IMF continued to vocalize its praise for what it perceived as Uganda’s sound economic policies. In a September 2003 review of Uganda’s economic performance, an IMF official expressed the institution’s support for Uganda’s export-led growth. In 2005, the IMF approved a 100 per cent debt relief initiative for the country, not to relieve the impoverishment of its citizens, but rather because it had “enjoyed robust economic expansion with low rates of inflation for more than five years,” a shocking demonstration of the ease with which the IMF can choose to disregard the connection between economic profit and widespread massacres occurring in the DRC.

Congo’s Dirty War: the Intersection of Legal and Illegal in the Global Economic Structure

The economic dimension of the Congo war which hearkens back to the colonial period and constitutes one of the most insidious and flagrant abuses of power in the country concerns the role of transnational mining companies directly implicated in the war. The proliferation of these numerous companies recalls the “internationalization” of the country which took place in the era of Belgian colonialism and throughout the mineral exploration activities of the 20th century. Eighty-five multinational companies operating in the DRC during the war are named in the UN Panel of Experts investigation for violation of the OECD guidelines on multinational enterprises. One of them is a Ugandan-Thai company, DARA-Forest which was denied a forest concession by authorities in Kinshasa, but proceeded with the logging of timber after obtaining permission from the RCD-ML Congolese rebel faction. Governments of the intervening countries granted several mining concessions to powerful multinational enterprises with the aim of financing the war and obtaining arms in return for the profits accruing to the companies, for instance, the Congolese government granted a monopoly over diamonds to the International Diamond Industries which enabled it to purchase arms and military equipment from the Israeli army, with whom the Director of the IDI, Dan Gertler, had “special ties.”

The frequently concealed connection between Western government elites and foreign mining companies enables Western countries to pay lip-service to the issue of resolving foreign conflicts, while quietly sanctioning the illegal activities of these companies whose profits are undoubtedly beneficial to them. Like the operation of mineral extraction companies in the colonial era, these companies function in a remarkably autonomous manner, as there are no legally binding mechanisms in place to regulate their behavior. The UN Panel of Experts lists numerous African individuals, heads of states and rebel groups involved in the extractive industry, but its investigation fails to include the role of Western government elites, leaving its evidence incomplete, and thereby inaccurate. The report by Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, which thoroughly investigates the intimate connection between rebels groups and the gold company Anglo-Gold Ashanti, likewise fails to mention the connections between Western governments and mining companies. For instance, Human Rights Watch does not mention that AngloGold Ashanti is partnered with the company Anglo-American owned by the Oppenheimer family as well as with Canadian company Barrick Gold. Barrick Gold operates close to AngloGold Ashanti, in the town of Bunia where the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces controlled the mines at intermittent periods during the war. One of Barrick Gold’s advisors is former US President George HW Bush and previous directors of the company include Brian Mulroney, the former Prime Minister of Canada and former US Senator Howard Baker. The insidious nature of these economic networks which undermine judicial notions of “legal” and “illegal” become more apparent if one only observes the exchanges which occurred between legally sanctioned mining companies and rebel groups in the Congo.

In 2005, Human Rights Watch published a report on the human rights abuses linked to two key gold mining areas in the DRC bordering Uganda: Mongbwalu in Ituri District and Durba in the Haut-Uélé district. From 1998 to 2003, Ugandan soldiers extracted over $9 million worth of gold from the northeastern districts. Following Uganda’s and Rwanda’s withdrawal in 2003, local proxies were left behind by both sides, including the Hema Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and the Front des Nationalists et Intégrationnistes (FNI) which fought over gold-abundant areas, killing thousands of civilians. On November 18th, 2002, the UPC attacked Mongbwalu in a 6-day military operation. According to a witness in Mongbwalu, the combatants “took Kasore, a Lendu man in his thirties, from his family, and attacked him with knives and hammers. They killed him and his son (aged about 20) with knives. They cut his son’s throat and opened his chest. They cut the tendons on his heels, smashed his head and took out his intestines. The father was slaughtered and burnt.” It has been estimated that at least 800 civilians were killed in UPC attacks from late 2002 to early 2003. Like the Hema combatants who indiscriminately targeted all Lendu civilians, the FNI began indiscriminately killing all civilians suspected of having helped the Hema when they took over the areas occupied by the UPC. In May 2003, FNI forces receiving military support from Ugandan soldiers, killed some 500 civilians in a “48-Hour War” and in June, attacked several villages, torturing, burning and finally killing the Hema women that they found.

During this period, one of the largest gold companies in the world, Anglo-Gold Ashanti, which calls itself “a responsible corporate citizen” and claims that it “aims to operate in workplaces that are safe and healthy,” sent a company representative to Mongbwalu in May 2002 to make contact with the UPC concerning gold exploration activities. Although its mining contract and official communications were with the government in Kinshasa, the area around Mongbwalu where the mining was to occur was firmly out of the control of the central government. Subsequent to the transfer of power from the UPC to the FNI, between July and September 2003 when the FNI were conducting an ethnic killing campaign where victims had their arms tied, sticks shoved into their rectums and body parts cut off, the company AngloGold Ashanti obtained permission from the FNI to commence gold extraction activities. To protect its employees from militia groups, AngloGold Ashanti employed a private security company, ArmorGroup International. Several allegations have been leveled against these private companies for their tendency to resort to acts of terrorism, sabotage and violence against civilian populations. AngloGold Ashanti is only one among several companies supposedly operating within the law, carrying on enterprises which enrich their own pockets, those of their shareholders, as well as those of the rebels and private security firms carrying out brutal atrocities against civilian populations.

In return for granting concessions to AngloGold Ashanti, the FNI were given benefits of various types, including financial assistance in the form of an $8000 dollar payment in April 2005 and frequent levies of 6 US cents per kilogram of cargo flown into the airport at Mongbwalu. The company also provided the FNI with logistical, transportation, and housing assistance and, in a shocking demonstration of the nature of their means of operation, urged MONUC to “adopt a conciliatory stance in their dealings” with some of the FNI armed groups. Journalists have written that Human Rights Watch did not reveal the most damning evidence they found- that AngloGold Ashanti sent its top lawyers into the country to protect rebel militia leaders. In consequence, the intimate relationship between AngloGold Ashanti and the armed groups increased the latter’s prestige in the eyes of the President Kabila and in the area where they operated. As one interviewee ironically remarked, “Ashanti will give dignity to the FNI.” The company’s readiness to proceed unhindered in its extraction activities was revealed by Vice President of AngloAshanti Charles Carter, who in July 2004 expressed his excitement about the “growth prospects in Central Africa” and the Congo, “potentially a huge gold province.” Other allegations implicate Canadian company Anvil Mining in an October 2004 massacre at Kilwa in which the company provided the Congolese army with ground transportation to assist in the military assault of the town and to remove corpses left in the aftermath of the invasion. Clive Newall, the CEO of First Quantam Minerals, the largest shareholder in Anvil Mining, succinctly explained the stance of Canadian mining companies in the DRC, “It’s the holy grail of the copper industry. Companies are saying: to hell with the political risk, we just have to be here (in DRC).”

In many ways, the Second Congo war demonstrates that the colonial enterprise of the twentieth century is still flourishing quite successfully, in the form of direct foreign exploitation of the DRC’s mineral resources. The indisputable link between rebel groups, mining companies, private security firms and Western governments calls into question tenuous beliefs regarding the “legal” nature of economic transactions in the mineral industry. In a climate of war in which each side is invested in the continuance of war for economic profit, the concept of legality is continually reinterpreted, ignored for convenience purposes or discarded altogether. Yet despite the dangerous outcome of granting mining companies virtually free rein in their economic projects, the fact that these companies are expected to abide by the law means that at the very least, there is a possibility that legal action can be taken against them.

Conversely, the creation of what has been defined as an illicit economy in natural resources during the second Congo war precludes the possibility of adopting legal measures since identifying the culprits is almost impossible. In mineral-lucrative areas where mining concessions have not been granted to mining companies but instead exploited on a smaller scale by the rebel armies themselves, the journey of a mineral on its way to the global market reveals the functioning of more insidious forms of power. In this type of transaction, for instance in the case of gold, rebel groups and armies employ artisanal miners to work in the mines like slaves, beating them if they refuse to work under the deplorable conditions in the mines, or if they fail to deliver the amount of gold demanded. In one case, Ugandan soldiers recklessly directed local miners to mine the pillars of Gorumbwa mine which eventually collapsed killing one hundred miners trapped inside. A network of traders then transports the mineral either from the rebels or from the artisanal miners directly to trading houses located near the Ugandan border whose owners are closely connected to rebel groups. From there the gold is delivered to unauthorized Ugandan traders based in Kampala where the gold became “legalized,” which means it is treated as if it were a transit good, registered on various customs documents in order to “make” it acceptable on the unregulated global market. Over seventy per cent is then exported to Switzerland, where it is “officially registered as an import.” Some of the gold exported to Switzerland during the war has been purchased by one of the world’s leading refiners of gold, Metalor Technologies SA. The company has repeatedly denied that its goods are connected to criminal networks in the Congo, but given that Uganda has no domestic gold production, it is probable that Metalor’s gold originated in northeastern Congo. With regard to coltan production, a similar massive trafficking enterprise was undertaken; according to UN estimates, as much as 60 to 70 per cent of total coltan production was mined under the direct surveillance of the Rwandan army by late 2002, using methods of forces labour. The coltan was then transported to Rwandan companies, to international trading companies and finally to processing companies in Europe and elsewhere.

In this very complex web of unregulated and undocumented exchanges, the invisible connection between the first and last stage of transactions involving highly mobile mineral resources simply continues to exist within a global economic structure in which the interplay between legal and illegal factors makes the two concepts virtually indistinguishable. The integration of illegal activities into the very structure of the global economy makes the task of seeking just means to rectify these wrongs almost laughable. Even when it comes to redressing the illegal activities of transnational companies and the direct collusion they enjoy with illegal rebel groups outside the control of the central government, one imagines that the only sensible approach would be the application of legally binding mechanisms to mitigate and stem their illegal practices. However, there are no legally binding requirements that can regulate the activities of mining companies, and at the international level, no political will to directly confront the roots of the conflict. In their final report published in October 2003, the UN Panel of Experts claimed that the cases of the companies allegedly in violation of the OECD guidelines had been “resolved,” without any information on how this decision had been made. As for the UN Organization Mission in the DRC, the organization has not integrated the link between resource exploitation and war in the analysis they use to bring peace to the country. In short, most efforts undertaken at the international level to bring protracted warfare to an end in the DRC have persistently refused to address the economic origins of the problem.

The Final Transaction; Anonymous Commodities in the Market Economy
Presiding over the intricate web of economic exchanges in mineral resources is the global market where consumers at the buying end of the transaction remain incognizant of the fact that their cell phones, pagers, computers, and diamond rings have been obtained at the expense of millions of civilian lives. While many advocates of globalization celebrate the rapid advancement in technology which has transpired over only a few decades, they fail to acknowledge that increasingly efficient consumer goods that are the hallmark of today’s industrialized countries have been purchased with a corresponding deterioration of entire nations. The demand for coltan, a mineral used to process tantalum for mobile telephones, nuclear reactors and missile technology, has grown since 1992 at an average of 10 per cent as a result of the growing market in mobile phones and gold consoles. In the year 2000 during the Congo war, world wide consumption of tantalum rose by 38 per cent. One of the causes of the increasing demand for coltan was the popularity of Sony Playstations filled with coltan. Sony itself may not use Congolese coltan, but its demand for the mineral, 80 per cent of which is found in the Congo, increased the price, which in turn fuelled conflict over the resource. In late 2000, a deficit in supply of the mineral increased its price to $365 per pound. Authors Dena Montague and Frida Berrigan reveal that a global shortage of coltan in December 2000 caused a “wave of parental panic” in the US when PlayStation II suddenly became scarce. The sheer absurdity of today’s globalized and highly unequal economic system is summed up in the unexaggerated image of “kids in Congo… being sent down mines to die so that kids in Europe and America could kill imaginary aliens in their living rooms.”

Ironically, Western countries’ attempts to make technological products environmentally friendly by banning lead from the solder used in cell phones and other electronic goods increased the demand for lead-free solder, ninety-five per cent of which consists of tin. In response, the world-wide price of tin was increased by an estimated 150 per cent between August 2002 and May 2004, which in turn intensified the conflict in the DRC. That the invisible hand of the market and consumer demand in Western countries, worlds away from the “civil war” in the Congo can indirectly determine the fate of real human lives begs the question: who is truly responsible for the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

Conclusion
It is questionable whether attempts by the International Criminal Court to bring to justice the rebel leaders responsible for carrying out widespread atrocities against Congolese civilians have yielded any concrete and long-term outcomes. Most efforts designed to enforce justice in the aftermath of the war have conveniently diverted attention from the integrated nature of the various actors functioning within elaborate economic networks and instead have adopted a narrow and restricted approach to the definition of “war crimes” and “illegal activities.” It is hardly surprising, given that the Congo war is only one outcome of a historical trend of global inequality that touches even the realm of international justice, that Western actors involved in perpetuating the war by providing financial and military assistance to the rebels are immune from prosecution. On April 3rd, 2007, the Democratic Republic of Congo suspended all new mining deals in order to review the contracts of the companies still operating in the country. One of them is AngloGold Ashanti. Yet given that no legally binding mechanisms exist to curb the illegal operations of transnational mining companies, it is unlikely that the future of the country will be drastically different from a past characterized by continued foreign domination.

The historical precedents to the Congo war, and in particular, the prominence of violence in the country from the time of King Leopold II to the period of recent conflict, preclude the possibility of analyzing the features of war in isolation or of dismissing it as a tragic but not so significant anomaly in the history of the region, a tendency which the mainstream media has consistently encouraged. Instead, a critical and nuanced attitude must be adopted for the purposes of rectifying common misconceptions and simplifications about the region as a whole, and more importantly, for the purposes of understanding not only how the second Congo war cannot be characterized as a “civil” or regional war, but also how it embodies the symbiotic relationship between war and resource extraction for profit. This latter feature reveals the true nature of today’s unregulated capitalist economy whose roots have penetrated every region of the world. As film director Hubert Sauper remarks in his statement about the fish industry around Lake Victoria: “I could make the same kind of movie in Sierra Leone, only the fish would be diamonds, in Honduras, bananas, and in Libya, Nigeria or Angola, crude oil.” Likewise, similar comparisons can be made between the Democratic Republic of Congo’s economic war over mineral resources, and Sierra Leone’s and Angola’s civil wars over conflict diamonds. Perhaps the most disquieting truth about the trade in mineral resources is that upon arrival at their final destination in the market of consumer goods and electronic commodities, all traces of their original identity are lost, including the identities of the countless millions who perished to obtain them.

World Bank accused of razing DRC forests

Deforestation in the Congo
Source: New Scientist.

It is staggering the number of things which basically are not attended to in the DRC. Here we have the World Bank in charge of how the forests should be dealt with. Of course, what happens to people, especially those who live in the forest, including the pygmees, does not seem to matter. It is as if slavery never really ended because the same system which was born out of it has been carrying on. The system has allowed for more field slaves to become house slaves, and it has created possibilities for house slaves also to own slaves and other types of property.

The mindset which was born out of the enslaving of millions of people has not changed, it has been refined in such a way that its functioning is not understood as the source of the problem. By functioning I mean its objective, its raison d’être.

It is interesting that during the Mobutu years, in Zaire people complained a lot about the inversion of values. Now, in the US and in many other so-called advanced countries, one reads about the loss of values. By its very nature, capitalism, as such, cannot preserve values, it can only destroy them and replace them with its mindset, namely turn everything into money making schemes. As the popular saying has it, everyone is looking for how “to make a killing”. With millions looking for ways to make a killing, is it surprising that humanity is fast disappearing and can only hope to survive thanks to humanitarianism?

I have to end this with a question: how can one of the most advanced countries, the USA, still have the death penalty on its books and at the same time claim to be the country with such a high number of humanitarian organizations? Why can’t these humanitarian organizations turn their attention toward the biggest source of destruction of humanity?

Reposted from the Mail & Guardian Online, October 4, 2007.

The World Bank encouraged foreign companies to destructively log the world’s second largest forest, endangering the lives of thousands of Congolese Pygmies, according to a report on an internal investigation by senior bank staff and outside experts. The report by the independent inspection panel also accuses the bank of misleading the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) government about the value of its forests and of breaking its own rules. The DRC’s rainforests are the second largest in the world after the Amazon, locking nearly 8% of the planet’s carbon and having some of its richest biodiversity. Nearly 40-million people depend on the forests for medicines, shelter, timber and food. The report into the bank’s activities in the DRC since 2002 follows complaints made two years ago by an alliance of 12 Pygmy groups. The groups claimed that the bank-backed system of awarding vast logging concessions to companies to exploit the forests was causing “irreversible harm”. It will be discussed at board level in the World Bank within weeks and may lead to a complete rethink of how forestry in the DRC is practised. It is particularly embarrassing for the British government, which is a development partner of the bank and its third largest financial contributor. It encouraged the bank to intervene in the DRC forests with export-driven industrial logging and has earmarked about $100-million for further Congo basin forestry aid. When the bank moved back into the DRC in 2002, after years of war which cost up to four million lives, it said industrial forestry could contribute most strongly to the country’s recovery. In its rush to reform the economy it devised new forestry laws, divided the county into zones and aimed to create a favourable climate for industrial logging. But although the bank is legally committed to protecting the environment, and trying to alleviate poverty, the panel found that the policies it imposed on the DRC were having the opposite social and environmental effects:

* An area of 600 000 square kilometres of forest was earmarked for logging companies.
* The bank failed to address critical social and environmental issues.
* It ignored between 250 000 and 600 000 Pygmies believed to be living in the Congolese forests, even though their presence was well known and documented.
* It put the Pygmies in serious potential harm.

Criticism is made of the forestry reforms that the bank imposed in return for loans of more than $450-million. Initially, said the panel, “the bank provided [to the government] estimates of export revenue from logging concessions that turned out to be far too high. This encouraged a focus on reform of the forestry system at the expense of pursuing sustainable uses of forests, the potential for community forests and for conservation. For the most part foreign companies, or local companies controlled by foreigners, have been the beneficiaries of this,” the report said. In a scathing analysis of the bank’s economic reasoning, the panel said the bank had “distorted the real economic value of the country’s forests” by looking solely at the tax and revenue that increased industrial logging might generate. “There seems to have been little action to support alternative uses of the forest resources,” it said. The panel travelled deep into the forest to take evidence from the Pygmy communities, who told it they were not consulted before the bank launched its wide-ranging forestry reforms. One Pygmy leader told the panel: “We are being made poor in every aspect … the [logging] company prevents us from going into the forests.” Another said that the company had bought the land so that people could no longer live in the forests. “Roads are going ever deeper into the forests, opening it up. We are increasingly deprived of our foods and drugs. We have never seen anything from the bank except promises,” said a third. Research by non-government groups last year showed that 12 foreign-owned or foreign-controlled companies were encouraged by the bank to dominate the entire industry. Some had concessions of more than five million hectares, and all included Pygmy communities in their holdings. The bank is reviewing the legality of many of these concessions. On Wednesday international groups that have worked with Congolese communities said they were shocked by the panel’s findings. “The Pygmies must be fully involved in developing any future plans for the forest, and the bank need to find ways of helping them uphold their rights, rather than helping logging companies to destroy them,” said Simon Counsell, director of the Rainforest Foundation. “The World Bank must change drastically its forest policies. Industrial logging is not contributing to poverty reduction, while its expansion undermines future financial benefits for environmental services,” said Staphan van Praet, the Africa forest campaigner for Greenpeace International.

Tullow Oil’s Congo Exploration Pact to Be Canceled (Update3)

Original post at Bloomberg.com: U.K.

Aug. 17 (Bloomberg) — Tullow Oil Plc’s exploration contract in the Democratic Republic of Congo will be canceled after the government found irregularities in the agreement, said Hydrocarbons Minister Lambert Mende. Tullow’s stock fell.

Tullow said the agreement was valid and legally binding and offered to double its signing bonus as a gesture of goodwill. The London-based company and Canadian partner, Heritage Oil Corp., have been awaiting a decree from Congo’s President Joseph Kabila to allow them to start drilling on two blocks on Lake Albert on the Ugandan border.

“Tullow received a letter from me on July 25 saying I can’t present the dossier unless we’ve addressed the irregularities in the contract,” Mende said today in an interview in the capital, Kinshasa.

Foreign investment in Congo has been growing after seven years of civil war, which left 4 million people dead, ended in 2003. The country produces 25,000 barrels of crude oil a day from fields off its coast.

Tullow fell 3.5 pence, or 0.8 percent, to 429.5 pence on the London Stock Exchange. Earlier the stock fell as much as 7.7 percent. Tullow has a market value of 709 million pounds ($1.41 billion).

The country, which holds about a 10th of the world’s copper reserves, is also reviewing mining agreements and has challenged plans by Central African Mining & Exploration Plc to take over Katanga Mining Ltd. because it will change the ownership of a copper project in which the government has a stake.

International Standards

Mende said the July 2006 contract signed by Nicolas Bandingaka, a vice-minister, was done against the will of the minister at the time. It provided for payment for only one of the two blocks and didn’t follow “international standards” for the tenders, Mende said. The tender was published in only one local newspaper, he added.

“The government reserves the right to negotiate” a contract on the second block, Mende said in a letter shown to Bloomberg News.

Bandingaka, who signed the agreement, was legally entitled to do so as the minister was absent a lot during the signing, Tim O’Hanlon, Tullow’s vice president for African business, said in an interview from London today. The signing bonus of $500,000, the fee agreed to for both blocks, was paid, as specified in the contract, he added.

Oil Contracts

Tullow also secured signatures of the then finance minister and Cohydro, the state-owned oil company, O’Hanlon said. It was Congo’s responsibility to ensure correct tender procedures were followed, he said. The same procedure was followed in the signing of all oil contracts negotiated by Congo in recent years, he added.

“In my letter to the president last week, I said Tullow was prepared to raise its signing bonus to $1 million,” O’Hanlon said.

The contract gave Tullow 48.5 percent of the Block I and II concessions on Lake Albert, which cover about 6,500 square kilometers (2,500 square miles), while Heritage has 39.5 percent and state-owned oil company Cohydro the rest. Lake Albert is on Congo’s eastern border.

Tullow owns all of one block on the Ugandan side of the lake, and has a 50 percent share in two blocks operated by Heritage. The company found crude oil in all of the seven wells it drilled there last year, including the first discovery in Uganda.

It’s too early to tell how much oil the concessions in Congo may contain, O’Hanlon said in a June interview.

To contact the reporter on this story: Franz Wild in Kinshasa via the Johannesburg bureau on abolleurs@bloomberg.net

In Search of Congo’s Coltan

Originally posted on Pambazuka News August 8, 2007.

Bukavu is perched high above Lake Kivu, gently encroaching on the placid body of water between Rwanda and Congo. Once known as the pearl of Congo because of its beautiful climate and mountains, the Bukavu I found last summer barely resembles the famed city I heard about as a child.

In the past ten years, South Kivu province and its capital city of Bukavu have been known for two things: insecurity and coltan. I came for both. In anticipation of the country’s first multiparty elections in four decades, I wanted to understand the potential effect of insecurity on the elections and learn first-hand the role minerals such as coltan play in fueling insecurity.

Four times the size of France, and as big as the United States east of the Mississippi river, Congo holds 80 percent of the world’s reserves of coltan, a heat-resistant mineral ore widely used in cellular phones, laptop computers and video games. The ore derives its name from a contraction of columbium-tantalite, the scientific nomenclature.

Columbium-tantalite is so vital to the high tech industry that without it, wireless communication as we know it would not exist. Refined coltan yields tantalum, which is used primarily for the production of capacitors, critical for the control of the flow of current in miniature circuit boards. Tantalum is also used in the aviation and atomic energy industries.

Even though it has been exploited for years, this mineral did not come to prominence among the uninitiated until the “coltan rush” of the late 1990’s. At the beginning of 2000, a pound of unprocessed coltan cost between US$30 and US$40 on the international market. By the end of the year, the price had risen tenfold to US$400.

The advent of a new generation of mobile phones, the upsurge of tech products, and the popularity of video games such as Sony Playstation 2 increased demand for the ore to unprecedented levels and drove prices to new heights. Hoping to make money, thousands of Congolese men rushed to the mines.

Insecurity welcomes me as soon I exit Bukavu’s Kavumu airport. On the way to town, we pass a couple of United Nations peacekeepers’ camps – South Africans, Pakistanis and others. On the rest of the road, we see the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, known among the people as FARDC.

The FARDC does not inspire trust. Far from a typical army, it is a patchwork of various militias that fought each other not so long ago and still treat each other with suspicion. They idle at the market, smoke at the street corner or fight for public transportation with civilians. They are always armed, do not receive regular pay, and beg whenever they get a chance. Above all, they are hungry and mean. The FARDC seems to own the 35 kilometer-road to town.
The bad condition of the road mirrors the collapse of Congo’s infrastructure and reflects the failure of the State, which is unable to provide the minimum of public service. It takes over an hour to reach the center of town and I see no sign of coltan’s wealth. It is an old beat up city.

By the end of 2001, coltan overproduction and the subsequent decrease in demand drove prices down to their previous level. Adam Smith’s invisible hand did its job. A few international traders made a fortune and militia leaders stuffed their war chests and foreign bank accounts. Local miners, however, only had their dreams for trophy. Coltan perks had evaporated long before I arrived in town.

Bukavu mimics Congo’s problems. Like the country, South Kivu has unlimited potential, from its physical beauty to hydro-electrical capacity to human and natural resources. Yet, conflict, mismanagement and corruption prevent the region from benefiting from these riches.

“If you want to understand what has gone wrong in Congo,” says Thomas Nziratimana of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and vice governor of South Kivu in charge of finance, economy and development, “You start with the way the country has been run so far. Despotic regimes cannot attract investors. They create tensions that do not make anyone feel safe to come and invest.”

Congo has had its share of dictatorships, war and civil unrest. From 1965 to 1997, the late Mobutu Sese Seko presided over a kleptocracy – a predatory regime that benefited a few members of the political elite, bankrupted the rich country and left its population in misery.

“In the past we have had a highly centralized system where everything went to Kinshasa, the capital, yet the provinces were very productive. This has continued today,” reflects Nziratimana. “Eighty-five percent of the income generated in South Kivu is sent to Kinshasa and nothing remains here, nothing.”

The kleptocratic culture did not end with Mobutu’s fall. In May 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila forced Mobutu into exile and became president.

A former pro-Lumumba guerilla fighter who had trained along side Che Guevara in the hills of eastern Congo in the 1960’s, Kabila launched his rebellion from South Kivu with the support of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda in 1996. Bukavu served as his rear base and suffered great damage in human and infrastructure terms during the fighting.

In the new Kabila regime power remained in the hands of a few cronies who amassed wealth for themselves à la Mobutu. A new millionaire class emerged overnight as Congo sank deeper into misery. In 1998, after Kabila fell out of grace with his backers in Uganda and Rwanda, these two countries invaded Congo in an attempt to overthrow him. A multinational war followed, with Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia intervening on Kabila’s side. Unable to unseat Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda chose to support a second rebellion in eastern Congo.

In 2001, following Laurent-Désiré’s assassination, his son Joseph assumed the presidency. The city did not recover from the suffering. Neither did the country.

The conflict partitioned the country. Supported by Uganda, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo ruled over northern Congo, from east to west. Rwanda-backed RCD militiamen controlled eastern Congo for five years until a series of peace accords brought a transitional government in Kinshasa, which included leaders of various warring factions.

Rwandan occupation years also coincided with the coltan boom years. In fact, while neither Rwanda nor Uganda have gold, diamond or coltan deposits of significance, both countries have become important exporters of these minerals. A 2003 United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources accused both countries of prolonging the civil war so that they could illegally siphon off Congo’s wealth with the help of Western corporations.

This second rebellion, which has claimed over 4.4 million lives, has made Congo’s conflict the deadliest in the world since World War II. Mineral exploitation was one of the driving forces behind the war and the proliferation of militias; some of these militiamen still operate in the region and control mining areas.

When I inquire of the people how to get to a coltan mine, I receive different versions of the same response. “It’s too dangerous out there,” they say. “There is too much insecurity. We advise you, ‘don’t go to the mines’.” For several days, I tried to arrange a trip to the mines and found nobody to take me.

My search eventually takes me to the city’s Ibanda neighborhood, to the backyard of a two-story house that someone converted into offices. Olive Depot is one of the largest coltan companies in town, but to my surprise, it is unimpressive.

Considering the publicity coltan has received recently in Western media, I expected a large processing center – an imposing edifice with complex machines and engineers barking orders to their foremen. Instead, I found the most rudimentary of processing systems, two dozen men working with their hands and playing with dirt like children. No one barked orders. They worked in silence, interrupted only by the sound of their own movements.

My attention turns to several men squatting down and playing with dirt – black dirt – in a medium-sized hangar. “That is coltan,” says my guide Alexis Mushaka, a metallurgical engineer.

“Are you joking?” I ask. That dirt in front of me could not be the highly-prized coltan, the bloody ore that fueled the conflict and the subject of several UN investigations. “No, I am serious,” Mushaka responds as he motions me to follow him to the hangar.

The men give us a quick look and return to their business. They are covered in dust, coltan. A couple of them sift through a large bowl of dirt and blow on the dust, which falls on their faces. It looks terrible. Most of them do not wear any mask. Neither do they wear any uniform. They also do not wear shoes, perhaps by choice. I do not ask. They work in silence and quietly listen to Mushaka explain the process to me.

“First, the négociant brings the coltan from the mine,” he says and points to a white sack of dark brown dirt on the floor. “He sells it here and then these fellows start the separation process.”

The process means the men in the hangar have to separate all impurities from the product itself. “Deep in that dirt is coltan or its sister products of cassiterite and wolframite,” Mushaka continues, “and they will have to find it.” The end product looks like crushed gravel.

He beckons me to the other side of the hangar where a man dressed in a tank top and shorts sits on the floor, working with two small piles of black dirt. “Look, he is holding a magnet in his hand,” Mushaka says. “He is separating iron from the rest. The bag of cassiterite comes with all kinds of other minerals. They need to get all of them out.”

When I ask the men what type of work contract they have, I learn that most of them have no contract. Every morning a large group of laborers lines up outside the compound’s gate and ask for work. Few are chosen and the rest are sent home. They make less than US$1 a day.

“If we did not have this job, we will have no work,” says one of them when I ask why they accept to work in these conditions.

The négociant’s situation is not much different. As the middleman, he is very much at the mercy of the depot. “They wait until their merchandise is processed before they are paid,” Mushaka explains when I ask how a négociant sells his load. “The tonnage they bring does not equate their pay. It shrinks quite a bit after the impurities are sorted out.”

The négociant who arrives while I visit the depot says most of the time he is in the red. When asked why he still deals coltan considering his losses, his response reflects what the average Congolese worker in any profession says. “If I did not do this, then what else?” he retorts. He makes US$1.59 per pound.

On the international market, coltan costs between US$8 and US$18 per pound. If anyone still makes any money with coltan, it’s the processing depot and the other dealers on the international market. The final product is exported via Kigali in Rwanda to the ports of Mombassa and Dar-es-Salaam where it is shipped overseas.

The coltan business underscores the failure of the State. Beyond a new mining code adopted by the transitional government, which imposes a high tax rate on businesses and investors, the government has not undertaken any serious initiative to formalize the coltan industry, as is the case with other resources such as copper, cobalt and zinc.

“There is an issue with taxes these days,” says Nzojusa Belembo, director at Olive. “During the RCD rebellion, there was an exportation monopoly through a local company called SOMINGL. Companies paid a fixed tax, regardless of the product price fluctuation. Everyone benefited.”

After a pause, Belembo continues. “It is simple. We have porous borders,” he says. “You can cross the river to Rwanda with coltan in your pocket. They offer better prices there. Our legislation encourages fraud.”

The visit at the Olive Depot did not prepare me for what I saw at the mines. Dug on the steep flank of a high mountain, Mushangi mines are located about 90 kilometers west of Bukavu. Driving as fast as we could on an arduous road, the trip took two hours.

The mines are 15 kilometers from the Nzibira area where several militias have operated, including the Interahamwe and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda. The FARDC also has a post in the vicinity, which is not encouraging either. Insecurity required that we brought armed guards with us.

At Mushangi, a treacherous path leads to the mines where we find only a handful of adults. The mines are exploited by children of all ages, working in precarious conditions.

From sunrise to sunset, they toil in open pits with the most primitive tools and no protection from falling rocks and mudslides. They crawl through dark tunnels with no structural support.

In my travel across Congo, I have seen a great deal of suffering. Watching children crawl through those pits and tunnels tested my resolve. Ten-year old Bashizi tells me, “I do this hard work because my father is too old to support me.” He has been doing it for several months. “That is the only thing there is to do around here,” he says.

The children swarm around us, seeking attention and asking to be photographed. I snap several pictures as I speak with them and hear their stories. Through my lens, I see lost childhoods and broken dreams. Images from my own youth in a different Congo flash before my eyes when I push the button.

We ask 16-year old Baruti and his friends whether they understand where their coltan goes from Mushangi. “It goes to Bukavu,” they say. “Do you know coltan is highly prized in America and Europe? It is needed for computers, mobile phones and video games,” I follow. “No,” Baruti replies. Their world revolves around the open-pits where they spend seven days a week and make less than 20 cents a day.

One last question before we leave for Bukavu. It is three in the afternoon, and that is late to be out here. “Do you understand that the exploitation of coltan fuels the conflict in Congo?” I inquire. Baruti looks at me straight in the eye and answers, “If we knew that, we would no longer work here.”

* Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is an independent journalist and writer who traveled across Congo in the summer 2006 on a grant from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.

Affinor Resources Inc.: Acquisition of 10,204 Mining Squares in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Wednesday July 25, 3:23 pm ET

LAVAL, QUEBEC–(MARKET WIRE)–Jul 25, 2007 — Affinor Resources Inc (CDNX:AFI.V – News) (“Affinor”, the “Company”) announces it has acquired 100% of the rights of Ressources Minieres du Congo SPRL (“REMCO”), a commercial entity as per congolese laws, in 24 Exploration Permits. These 24 permits total 10,204 Mining squares or a surface of approximately 8,888 Km2 (approx: 900,000 Hectares). In order for Affinor to gain a 100% interest in the Permits, the terms of the agreement call for a cash payment of 500,000 USD and the issuance of 3,000,000 treasury shares over a period up to 6 months after approval of the transaction.

The concessions are located in the Oriental Kasai and Oriental provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and are, according to James Napier, geologist and qualified person as per Rule 43-101 “favourable zones for the eventual discoveries of potentially rich kimberlite deposits since they are located in the Congolese craton and have revealing kimberlite showings “.

The PENGE EAST permit (400 “mining squares”), is located in Oriental Kasai, Kabinda District, and covers a surface of approximately 348 km2. This permit is contiguous to the permits of BRC Diamonds Inc (BRC – TSX.V), which announced on July 5th 2007 its merger with Diamond Core Resources Limited (DMR – JSE). The permit is also close to the Southern Era (TSX-SDM) and Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA) permits.

The KATAKO-KOMBE permits (5,600 “mining squares”) are also located in Oriental Kasai in the Sankuru District, and total an approximate surface of 4,878km2. James Napier also notes in his report: “The selection of the Katako-Kombe permits is based on the abundance of alluvial artisanal diamonds in the Lukenie, Lomela and Tshuapa rivers that take their source in the arked Unia Lake. The latter represents for us explorers, a kimberlitic or lamproitic field of potential primary deposits”.

Up North, in the Oriental Province, Lower Uele District, are located the AKETI permits (4,204 “mining squares”) of an approximate surface of 3,662 km2.

“The selection of the Aketi permits in the Oriental province is based on the abundant placer diamond showings that have never been industrially mined in the Aketi River to the South, the Tele River at the center and the Rubi River to the North. The Likati River holds a diamond showing on the “Mineral Deposit” map and flows very near our concession. All the rivers cross our permits from East to West. Geologically, we are on the edge of the Congolese Craton where formations are migmatic granites from the Ganguen Kibalian corresponding to the Katangeze Kibarian more or less 1300 Ma.A that meets with the Katanguian corresponding Lindian (Roan and Kundelungu) more or less 900 Ma, all of which crossed by faults that may contain ultrabasic kimberlitic rocks or lamproitic (dykes and pipes). We have two potential for kimberlitic fields in this area:

– to the north of the town of Bima between the Rivers Api et Uele;

– to the North West of the town of Mangi.

There are also several gold showings in the “Mineral Deposits” map therefore it is possible that we may find an auriferous and primary deposit”. Quoting Napier’s report.

As described in Bardet’s chapter on Congo about the Aketi area: ” For the time being, their origin is mysterious (and we will encounter this problem anew in Oubangui, C.A.R in some areas quite close in the north such as N’Zako). Undoubtedly, Aketi is very close to Congo’s recovery basin, from which we can presume the hard rock to the south of the basin which could have extended more to the north in the past ?”.

“This new acquisition is positioning Affinor as one of the important concession’s holders in DRC in terms of surface owned and for the quality of the areas chosen”.

The first phase will consist in a general survey of the targeted zones by direct and indirect methods of research (in situ localization, large circuit samplings, lifts, grabs, manual pits, trenches, probes, geophysical methods: to be defined depending on the means). The second phase will be devoted to a detailed reconnaissance and will have to be defined once the results of the preceding phase are known.

This transaction is concluded without intermediary and is subject to regulatory approval.

The TSX Venture Exchange does not accept responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of the information presented in this release.

FACTBOX-Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Thursday June 28, 9:31 PM

June 28 (Reuters) – This month the Democratic Republic of Congo began its review of contracts for mining concessions.

The mineral-rich African country is looking at 60 mining deals, most of which were negotiated during a six-year war and the three-year transitional period that followed.

These are the main companies with mining projects in the Congo:

(* indicates a new or updated entry)

ANGLO AMERICAN

The world’s third biggest mining group recently opened an office in the city of Lubumbashi in the country’s copper belt. In Kinshasa, Anglo works from the office of diamond group De Beers, in which Anglo holds at 45 percent stake.

Anglo will be exploring in the DRC and seven other African countries to look for large base metals deposits. Chief Executive Cynthia Carroll said in June the company would inject $3.5 billion of new investment into Africa in the next five years.

AFRICO RESOURCES

Shares in Canadian company Africo fell 45.8 percent in April after the company said $90 million in financing had been cancelled owing to a court ruling in the DRC that denied Africo’s ownership in the Kalukundi copper-cobalt project.

A court in Lubumbashi ruled that Akam Mining SPRL, not Africo, owned 75 percent of the company that owns Kalukundi.

ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI

The world’s third biggest gold producer, of which Anglo American owns more than 40 percent, increased its exploration budget for the Congo to $15 million for 2007 from $8 million in 2006.

It has been drilling for gold at Mongbwalu in northeastern Ituri since 2005. AngloGold says the results so far support historical tonnage and grade estimates of 1.2 million ounces.

* ANVIL MINING

On Thursday, a military court in Congo acquitted three former Anvil employees of complicity in war crimes by government soldiers in 2004 [ID:nL28846669].

The company’s trucks and planes were used by the army in an attack on a town near Anvil’s Dikulushi mine. Anvil said its vehicles were requisitioned by the military, and it had no choice but to hand them over.

In April this year, Anvil’s board approved the construction of the 60,000 tonnes per year copper-making facility at its 95-percent owned Kinsevere project costing $238 million.

In addition, it owns 90 percent of the Dikulushi copper-silver mine, which produces 20,000 tonnes of copper and 1.8 million ounces of silver per year. Other projects include Mutoshi and Kinsevere. The Kulu mine at Mutoshi was temporarily closed in April last year after an attack on its property that left up to four people dead.

BANRO CORPORATION

Toronto-listed Banro has four gold properties comprising 13 exploitation permits in the South Kivu and Maniema provinces. Measured and indicated resources across the Twangiza, Kamituga, Lugushwa and Nomaya properties total 2.178 million ounces of gold.

BHP BILLITON

BHP, the world’s largest diversified miner, is exploring for copper and diamonds in the DRC. BHP will spend more than half its exploration budget for the fiscal year ending in June in Africa, it said. Earlier this year, it said it was in the “early stages” of looking at an aluminium smelter project in the country.

CAPITAL RESOURCE FUNDING CORP

This Chinese company, through its subsidiary Dalian Xinyang High-Tech Development (DLX), this month signed a contract to buy the prospecting and mining rights to a cobalt mine in Lubumbashi. DLX, one of the largest Chinese cobalt producers, will own 80 percent of the mined cobalt and Shengbao Group will own the remainder. DLX intends to build a facility to produce finished cobalt products from raw ore on-site, the firm said.

CENTRAL AFRICAN MINING AND EXPLORATION CO (CAMEC)

Is targeting production of 40,000 tonnes copper and 6,000 tonnes cobalt from its Luita plant by the end of March 2008, rising to 100,000 tonnes copper and 12,000 tonnes cobalt by the end of the year. Also has the rights to concession areas 467 and 469, which contain copper and cobalt mineralisation.

Camec has recently run into a row with the Congolese government over Zimbabwean businessman Billy Rautenbach, who owns a stake in the company and is a former head of state mining firm Gecamines.

Camec claims the dispute may be related to the stake it is trying to build in Katanga Mining , which also operates in the DRC. Katanga is attempting to get Canadian regulators to block Camec from adding to the 22 percent stake it already owns.

CHEMAF

Privately-owned Congolese company which owns the licence for the Etoile mine, estimated to hold 682,041 tonnes of copper and 108,951 tonnes of cobalt, and the yet unworked Makala deposit.

It also controls the Kananga concession in joint venture with state miner Gecamines.

Chemaf plans to begin industrial mining operations at the Makala and Kananga mines beginning in late 2007 or early 2008.

It owns a cobalt processing plant in Lubumbashi and is currently constructing a facility to produce copper cathode.

President Clinton Fueled War for Minerals – U.S. Congresswoman

Originally posted on AllAfrica.Com

Rwanda News Agency
Kigali, June 21, 2007

In May, outspoken former US congresswoman Cynthia McKinney testified in the Spanish probe investigating the deaths of Spanish nuns in this region. Now details show that she is reported to have alleged that the US government maintained ravaging conflicts in this region for mining concessions from D R Congo.

Ms. McKinney – sent to Africa in 1996 to carry out President Clinton’s policy in the Great Lakes region, told La Vanguardia that: “I accused his (Clinton) Administration of having acted as accomplices in the war crimes in (DR) Congo and instigating a genocide.”

“What my government wanted,” Ms. McKinney explained, “wasn’t in the best interest of the Congolese people: (President Bill) Clinton kept me there because he wanted an African-American whom Kabila trusted. Even though Mobutu was, technically, the President of Congo, it was Kabila who was in charge of granting the mining concessions.”

According to her, then rebel Laurent Kabila with the support of Rwandan forces continued making forays into the territory of the vast country with weapons and funds that he had gotten from the West.

Kabila apparently promised, in return, to grant the US the mining rights once he had conquered this territory rich in gold, diamonds, and coltan (an important component used in electronic equipment). And indeed, he would make good on his promise once he became president.

“In October 1996, (Laurent) Kabila began to attack Hutu refugee camps in Congo and by July he had already conquered the entire country,” Mr. Jordi Palou who is accompanying McKinney explained to the Spanish paper.

Information from the Spanish investigation into the deaths of the nuns and priests indicates that they were part of aid workers operating in camps housing thousands of Rwandan refugees in eastern D R Congo – the Zaire.

“There they are: commercial stakes, which, combined with an illegal arms trade, were out to make money by fueling a war – a war which has claimed the lives of 7 million people, both Rwandans and Congolese,” former U.S. congresswoman from Georgia.

But what started out as being a lawsuit that the Spanish justice system had initially accepted, to investigate accusation against top administration officials of the Rwandan government regarding the deaths of 9 Spanish volunteers, has now ended up becoming a legal case which seeks justice for all the people who died between 1990 and 2002.

The Audiencia Nacional (National Court of Spain) has been following up then details of the lawsuit initiated by International Forum for Truth and Justice in Africa of the Great Lakes Region.

In addition, the case is also evidencing the responsibility that mining companies are believed to have had all along.

“What the West perceives as tribal wars is indeed,” Mr. Palou added “hatred geared at obtaining benefits by taking advantage of the existing chaos.”